The operating target for monetary policy in the U.S. has changed from borrowings in the late 1980s to a target range for the fed funds rate to a specific fed funds target. In addition, secrecy about the policy target has largely disappeared and since 1994 policy targets have been announced immediately. We explore the impact of policy decisions on short-term interest rates as the policy announcements have changed. We find that the policy changes had a larger impact when the Fed moved to a specific emphasis on the fed funds rate. However, since the Fed began to announce the targets, policy changes have had a lesser effect on rates.
The Federal Reserve has made numerous changes in both the way it conducts monetary policy and the way it conveys monetary policy changes to the public.
After its brief flirtation with monetary aggregate targets from 1979-1982, the Fed introduced borrowed reserves targeting and then gradually moved to federal funds rate targeting. Moreover, in the 1990s, the Fed removed both the secrecy that long surrounded the policy targets and the delays in policy announcements. Everyone now knows that the Fed pursues a specific target for the fed funds rate and that the Fed makes an immediate announcement of changes in the target rate. In addition, since the introduction of immediate policy announcements, the Fed has made virtually all target rate changes at regularly scheduled Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. These procedures are quite a reversal from previous decades when the Fed was unwilling to acknowledge its choice of policy target, made no public announcements of policy changes and frequently adjusted policy between FOMC meetings.
In this paper we examine the variation in the financial market responses to policy changes in the 1990s as the Fed altered its policy targets and its procedures for policy announcements. Specifically, we investigate several hypotheses concerning the impact and lagged effects on short-term interest rates of changes in the fed funds target. First, the magnitude of the effects should increase when the Fed puts more emphasis on interest rates for both the operating and intermediate targets and is less concerned with the monetary aggregates. 1 Second, the impact of policy changes diminishes when the Fed begins immediate announcements of the policy target because the announcements make policy changes less uncertain and more easily predicted.
2 This hypothesis is just the opposite of the argument used by the Fed for decades, that immediate policy announcements would aggravate announcement effects and make policy implementation more difficult (see Belongia and Kliesen (1994) ). The policy targets may have become more predicable because the new announcement procedure introduced in 1994 coincided with the Fed beginning to make 1 This hypothesis relates to the behavior of interest rates when the Fed changes policy targets. Generally, there could be more interest rate variability when the Fed is following a smooth monetary aggregates target. 2 Roley and Sellon (1996) and Pakko and Wheelock (1996) argue that monetary policy became more predictable during the 1990s. Furthermore, Belongia and Kliesen (1994) show that there were no unusual interest rate movements when policy changes were "leaked."
target rate changes almost exclusively at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. Finally, immediate disclosure tends to reduce the delayed market response and thereby increases the immediate responses to policy changes.
Our major findings are:
• The size of the immediate market responses to policy changes increases when the Fed adopts the funds rate as its target and virtually ceases to monitor the monetary aggregates in the early 1990s.
• The market responses to policy changes decline in 1994 when immediate policy announcements are introduced 3 .
• Prior to the public policy announcements, market responses to policy changes often continued for several days after the policy change, but since that time there have been no delayed responses.
• The fed funds futures market largely anticipates Fed policy changes since immediate policy announcements were introduced.
There is a large literature on financial market responses to changes in monetary policy, particularly money supply announcements in the 1970s and 1980s, and to data announcements in general. More recently several studies have examined the impact of target rate changes on financial rates. 4 For example, Roley and Sellon (1996) present a model of the term structure's response to target rate changes and conclude that changes in the federal funds rate target affect both short-term and long-term interest rates and that target rate changes have become more predictable since 1987. As a result, a greater portion of the target rate changes is reflected in interest rates before the policy action is actually taken. Thus, the immediate interest rate response is lessened due to the greater predictability of the target changes.
There have been only a few articles that examine the changes in Fed procedures in the 1990s and none of these include more than a few observations since 1994, when the Fed started announcing policy changes. In this journal, Belongia and Kliesen (1994) examined the period 1989-93, which begins with the use of explicit federal funds targets for policy and culminates with the decision to announce these targets. Their principal finding was that the financial markets were largely unaffected by the move towards more transparent policy. Two more recent papers in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review by Thornton (1996 Thornton ( ,1998 also conclude that the change in policy announcement procedures did not increase market volatility. Thornton also finds that the magnitude of the market response has not been affected by the immediate disclosure of target changes and that the market response to this immediate disclosure occurs immediately.
Section I of this paper describes the evolution of monetary policy from the late 1960s through the 1990s. The data are described in Section II. Section III examines the change in market rates from immediately before to immediately after federal funds rate target changes. Section IV examines the degree to which the market rates reflect target changes before they occur and the speed with which target rate changes are reflected in market rates. Section V shows regressions estimates of the market reactions and tests for variation in the responses to target changes.
I. Evolution of Monetary Policy Implementation
The federal funds rate has been the operating target for monetary policy throughout the 1990s. The use of a funds rate target was developed in the 1960s and was used through the 1970s until October 1979 when the Fed introduced a procedure for targeting monetary aggregates instead. The Volcker Fed's experiment with a monetarist approach lasted about three years after which it was replaced by a borrowings target. As the demand for discount window borrowing became less stable and less predictable, the Fed increased its emphasis on the target for the funds rate. By the end of the 1980's, the Fed had returned to the explicit fed funds targeting procedure that is in use today.
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As the procedures changed, there was considerable variation in market responses to expected or actual changes in policy. An extensive body of econometric literature documents these phenomena (Cook and Hahn (1989) ; Thornton (1998) ). The earliest studies looked at the effect of weekly announcements of changes in M1 and M2 on interest rates. Interest rates changed because market participants expected the Fed to respond when money growth deviated from the desired rates. Moreover, the response was largest when policymakers emphasized the importance of the monetary aggregates (Urich and Wachtel (1981) Poole (1999) notes that the current approach to implementing monetary policy is the same as the one used in the era of increasing inflation rates and thus there is no guarantee that current practice will maintain low inflation. 6 For many years the Fed avoided using the term minutes for this information. Currently the terms used are "statement" for the announcement made immediately after the meeting, "minutes" for the directive and policy record and "transcript" for edited transcripts that are made available with a five-year delay.
FOMC directive. 8 On February 4, 1994, the FOMC broke with prior practice and announced that it had decided to "increase slightly the degree of pressure on reserve positions …[an action] expected to be associated with a small increase in short-term money market rates." The immediate announcement of a policy change represented a dramatic shift in the FOMC's attitude toward the public release of information about future monetary policy. From this point forward, the FOMC continued to announce policy changes immediately after a change had been made. These announcements contained both a brief qualitative discussion about the policy decisions and gave an indication of the magnitude of the impact on the federal funds rate. For example, the announcement following the August 16, 1994 meeting disclosed that the FOMC had decided to increase the discount rate 50 basis points, and that "this increase would be allowed to show through completely into interest rates in reserve markets" (see Pakko (1995) ).
Starting in July 1995, the Federal Reserve began to announce the specific target rate immediately after a decision had been made to change policy. All but 2 of the 14 target changes between January 1994 and December 1998 were made at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. In contrast, from January 1989 to December 1993, only 7 out of the 30 target changes were made at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings.
Further, after the December 1998 FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve announced that it would make additional information public by issuing explanations of monetary policy on an infrequent basis. It said that these announcements would be used to communicate a major shift in views about the balance of risks or the likely direction of future policy, even at times when interest rates were not changed. This approach soon turned out to be confusing and in January 2000, the Fed announced that a public policy statement would be issued immediately after every FOMC meeting. It now appears that the Federal Reserve considers more, not less, public disclosure valuable to its conduct of monetary policy.
Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve's earlier arguments against the immediate public disclosure of information about changes in monetary policy, there had been some public disclosure of information about changes in current monetary policy prior to 1994, 7 Belongia and Kliesen (1994) describe the 1976 and 1981 opinions in the Merrill vs. the FOMC cases.
both through discount rate changes and "leaks" to the financial press. During this period, discount rate changes, which are always made public, had been made at the same time as changes in the federal funds rate target. Furthermore, from 1989 to 1998, the Federal
Reserve changed the discount rate every time it changed the target rate 50 basis points or more. Thus, a discount rate change implied a strong probability that a federal funds rate target change had also occurred.
II. The Data
Policy changes. Federal funds target rates and discount rate changes are shown in Table 1 . We start in 1989 when, as already noted, the Fed had clearly returned to fed funds targeting. Between January 1989 and December 1998, there were forty-four changes in the federal funds target rate and fifteen changes in the discount rate. From January 3, 1989 to July 7, 1989, the federal funds target was set as a range that varied from 0 to 12.5 basis points. After that, the federal funds target was a single value. An average of the lower and upper limits of the range was used as the target when a range was specified. The federal funds target was 9% on January 3, 1989 and was increased in six small increments to an However, there were several instances early in the period where as many as four changes in the target rate took place within days of each other.
The fifteen discount rate changes were all made on the same day as a funds rate target change and were always made when there was a large (50 basis points or more)
8 Belongia and Kliesen (1994) of the data shows that these changes are due to large changes either on the day before or on the day of the target rate change, which reversed on the subsequent day.
Next, we examine the target rate change effect on the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the fed funds futures rate for the contract that matures in the month following the target change. From 1989 through 1992, the changes in TB3 and FFF are calculated from the day before to the day of the target rate change. Subsequently, the changes in TB3 and FFF are calculated from the day before the announcement to the day of the announcement.
11 Table 2 shows that prior to the change in data announcement at the start of 1994, both FFF and TB3 typically decrease on the day of target rate decreases and increase on the day of target rate increases. The magnitude of the changes increases as the change in procedure approaches. The average changes in FFF and TB3 for the last four target rate 10 Banks normally borrow or lend reserves in the federal funds market early in the day. They typically adjust their reserve positions late in the day only in response to unanticipated changes in their need for reserves. 11 TB3 is a market-closing rate and FFF is the rate implied by the settlement price of the futures contract. Both rates are taken well after the announcements and reflect the immediate response to the announcement. In the year after the change in announcement procedures (1994), there are several target rate increases and, except for one target rate change, FFF and TB3 both increase on the days of target rate increase announcements. However, the magnitude of the interest rate response is smaller than just prior to the change in procedure, despite the fact that four of the seven target rate increases are 50 basis points or greater. For these seven target rate increases in the year after the change in the announcement procedure, the average changes in FFF and TB3 are only 6 and 9 basis points respectively.
Policy begins to loosen in 1995, and FFF and TB3 decrease following five of the six target rate decreases. However, the changes in FFF and TB3 are small when compared to the responses observed just prior to the change in announcement procedure. The exception is target rate change number 43 (October 15, 1998), which caught the market by surprise because it was not made at a regularly scheduled FOMC meeting and occurred only three weeks after the previous target change.
The raw data in Table 2 suggest that the federal funds cash and futures rates and the Treasury bill rate all respond to changes in the funds target rate. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the changes in TB3 and FFF are very similar to each other throughout our sample interval. However, there is a period of larger responses just prior to the Fed's change in its announcement procedures.
IV. Gradual Responses of the Funds Rate to Target Changes
observation, the changes in the Treasury bill rate and the fed funds futures rate were calculated from October 15 to October 16.
If market participants anticipate a change in the target funds rate, the funds rate may move towards the new target even before any policy change is made. In addition, the impact of a target change may not always be instantaneous. The response may be delayed for some days after the policy change. In this Section, we examine the lags and leads in fed funds reactions -in both the spot and futures markets --to target rate changes before and after the change in announcement procedure. The spot federal funds rate may not move toward a new target rate very far in advance of an anticipated change. The overnight federal funds rate is the rate for overnight reserve balances. Because reserve balances are perishable, future reserves and immediately available reserves are not good substitutes for one another. The same argument cannot be made for the Fed funds futures rate. 13 We also examine the deviations of the futures rate from the final settlement price of the contract and from the average target rate in the settlement month. Results are basically the same as those shown here.
bottom panel shows the target rate changes following the start of policy change announcements. In this period there is a period of monetary tightening followed by a period of monetary easing. In order to provide a consistent picture of average deviations from target, the signs are reversed on deviations when there are target rate increases.
The top panel of Figure 1 also shows that prior to the policy change announcements, the funds rate slowly drifts from roughly 40 basis point above the new target rate a week before the target change, to 25 basis points above the target on day -1, the day before the change.
t FT then declines 15 basis points to roughly 10 basis points above the target on day zero, the day that the target change was implemented, and then slowly drifts to near zero over the next several days.
Target rate changes in this period did not typically occur at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. Although the federal funds rate declined consistently, the dates and magnitudes of the changes are hard to predict. The FFR decline in the week before the target change may have been due, at least in part, to a lower demand for funds as the economy slowed. Fed watchers have also suggested that the FOMC sometimes lowered its target rate to make it consistent with the market-determined federal funds rates.
Nevertheless, there appears to be a FFR response to open market operations (and/or a discount rate change) on the day the target changes are implemented. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the Federal Reserve, if it so desired, could not move the effective funds rate to its new target level, about an additional 10 basis point on average, on the first day that the new target rate was in place. The delay in reaching the new target level suggests that the Federal Reserve let FFR drift to its new target rate and/or slowly moved FFR to the new target.
The story told by the futures data is slightly different. Prior to the change in announcement procedure, t FFT is slightly greater than 15 basis points until about three days before the target change. It then declines 5 basis points over the next three days to roughly 10 basis points on day -1, the day before the change. After the change in announcement procedure, virtually all target rate changes occur at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. On average, the funds rate is about 40 basis points away from the target a week before the change and about 20 basis points away on the day the change is announced. It reaches zero within a day or two of the announcement. As expected there is almost no change in FFR on the day of announcement because the funds rate has largely been determined for the day prior to the announcement. The funds market appears to correctly anticipate changes in the target but not always the full amount of the change.
After the change in the announcement procedure, the futures market data show small deviations from the target prior to the target change. The futures rate changes on the announcement date and overshoots the target change by about 10 basis points. Thus, it appears that the futures contract fully anticipates the target change before it occurs, and the announcement of a change leads the market to forecast a further change before the end of the following month. In 1995, the year following the change in the announcement procedure, there are target rate increases four months in succession that are followed by three large target rate increases spread out over several months. The financial markets have a difficult time predicting the timing and magnitude of each of these changes.
V. Tests for a Change in the Interest Rate Response to Target Changes
In this section we present regression estimates of the impact of changes in the fed funds rate targets on interest rates. The immediate market reaction to target changes is examined with the following equation:
where = ∆ it R change in rate i from day t-1 to day t, and = ∆ t T change in the fed funds rate target from day t-1 to day t. Table 3 summarizes the results of estimating equation (1) for the 44 target rate changes between 1989 and 1998 using ordinary least squares with White's heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors reported in parentheses.
The top panel of Table 3 shows the estimates of 1 β with each interest rate. All three coefficients are positive and the impact on the futures rate and on the bill rate are significant at the 1% level. The impact on the funds rate is significant only at the 6% level, although the coefficient is the largest of the three, 0.451.
We next examine the impact of target rate changes prior to and after the start of policy announcements in 1994, using dummy variables Table 3 and indicate that the responses to target changes are positive for the periods both before and after announcements but smaller in the latter period. However, a
Wald test for the equality of the coefficients for the pre-and post-policy announcement periods differ significantly only for the fed funds futures rate.
In the post-announcement period almost all policy changes were made at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings while in the earlier period only one-fourth of the changes were made at regular meetings. Although the number of target changes is fairly small, we tested for differences in the impact of changes made at regular meetings or at other times. Our results (not shown here) indicate that there are no significant differences between the impact of changes made at FOMC meetings or at other times.
In addition to the change in the announcement procedure in early 1994, there are other reasons why the impact of a target change on market interest rates might vary. For example, there are at least two reasons why the impact of target changes should have increased during the pre-announcement period. First, both the increased importance of the funds rate target for policy after 1989 and the use of specific policy targets could have resulted in increased impact of target changes. Second, publicity about leaks of policy information both before and after FOMC meetings led to an increased emphasis on the policy changes.
Thus, it is of interest to examine the variation in the impact of policy target changes on interest rates. However, the irregularity of the time between target changes and the small sample size indicate that time varying parameter estimation is not an appropriate methodology to use with this data set to capture variation in the coefficients.
14 Alternatively, the method of recursive residuals can be used to test for coefficient instability. 15 We examine the cusum and cusum squared plots (not shown here) for the estimates of equation (1) with each of the three interest rates, and find some evidence of coefficient instability, most strongly for the Treasury bill equation. (observations 27 to 30), declines in 1994 after announcements started and then levels off.
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The results in the previous section indicate that the response of interest rates to a change in the target rate is often spread out over several days. To examine this, we estimate equation (3) with a full daily sample that includes all days with interest rate observations between 1989 and 1998.
where
The coefficients on t T 3 ∆ represent the delayed market response to target rate changes from day t-3 to day t-1. 17 Equation (3) is also estimated with dummy variables (as in equation (2)) to capture the impact of target changes before and after announcements started.
The results are summarized in Table 4 and show (as in Tests for the equality of the response in the two time intervals indicate that the total response and the delayed response are significantly different after January 1994 for the Treasury bill and futures rates. The results in Table 4 indicate that the immediate impact of the change in the fed funds rate target decline when the Fed began making its explicit 16 Estimating equation (1) for the first and second half of the pre-announcement period (not reported here)
shows that 1
β is approximately twice as large in the second half of the data interval for all three rates.
Further, the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level for the Treasury bill rate and the Fed funds futures and at the 10% level for the fed funds rate. 17 Thornton (1996) uses a similar specification to capture the delayed market response to target changes. We find that a three-day delayed market response provides the best results.
targets known. Further, the small delayed impacts on the Treasury bill rate and on the futures rate largely disappear. 18 The Fed adopted the explicit targets gradually (before they began to announce them) and the public learned about this slowly from information leaks and other discussions. Thus, the change in the interest rate response might have evolved over time. That is, we imagine that it increased over time as market participants learned about the Fed's emphasis on the target and then declined as the changes in target rates came to be largely anticipated.
VI. Conclusion
From the mid-1980s until the present, the Fed has changed its views of the operating target for monetary policy and its views about how to make monetary policy changes public. As it evolved towards a greater emphasis on the funds rate target, the market impact of changes in the target increased. However, as it increased the flow of information about the policy targets (from innuendo to information leaks to formal announcements), the amount of new information in a target change decreased and the impact on market interest rates diminished. The Fed continues to review and revise the way it conveys information about monetary policy to the public. Most recently, it changed the language used to convey information about its policy intentions and started making a policy statement after every FOMC meeting. It remains to be seen how these changes will affect financial markets and expectations about monetary policy. In the bottom figure, the signs are reversed on the deviations when there are target increases to provide a consistent picture of average deviation from target. Before Announcements (June 1989 -September 1992 After Announcements (February 1994 -November 1998 
